



Journal of the Society of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science in Spain

Call for participation in a monographic section on "Perspectivism and points of view"

The next issue of the journal will dedicate a monographic section to the themes and problems addressed in the recent collective book:

Manuel Liz y Margarita Vázquez (eds.). *Tiempo y Perspectiva*, Barcelona, Laertes, 2022.

Call for papers*

Three kinds of papers are welcome:

- 1) Comments and criticism concerning any of the chapters of the book that is proposed to be discussed.
- 2) Development of lateral aspects related to the topics developed in the book.
- 3) Original papers addressing the general topic of the monographic.

*At the end of the call for papers there is a list of recent approaches in philosophy related to the topic of "Perspectivism and points of view" and a long abstract of the book.

Contact and send papers

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Information for authors

- The length of the papers to be submitted for evaluation should not exceed 5000 words.
- Papers written both in Spanish and English will be accepted.
- The deadline for submitting papers is December 31, 2022.
- Authors must use the APA citation system.

Recent developments related to the general topic “Perspectivism and points of view”

- **Philosophy of science**
Scientific perspectivisms of Evandro Agazzi, Nancy Cartwright, Ronald Giere, Michela Massimi, Sandra Mitchell, Paul Teller, or Bas van Fraassen.
- **Philosophy of language**
Use of perspectives as semantic evaluation indexes in François Recanati, Max Kölbel, or John MacFarlane.
- **Philosophy of mind**
 - 1) Approaches of Daniel Dennett.
 - 2) The inevitability of aspects raised by Wittgenstein throughout all of his writings and condensed in his discussion of the duck-rabbit image.
 - 3) Problems introduced by Thomas Nagel concerning "what is it like to be a bat".
- **Epistemology**
The crucial role that the reflexive perspective that a subject can take on his position in reality has in the virtue-based epistemology elaborated by Ernest Sosa.

- **Metaphysics**

- 1) The distinction drawn by Carnap and Putnam, erased by others and drawn again and again, between what is "internal" and what is "external" to a conceptual scheme.
- 2) Bernard Williams's arguments about the ideal existence of an absolute conception of reality, a conception intending to be independent of all points of view.
- 3) Constructive proposals such as the world-making of Nelson Goodman or the guises theory of Hector-Neri Castañeda.

- **Normative and practical issues**

- 1) The differential importance that some perspectives can have, for example, the feminist point of view such as Sandra Harding proposed it in her standpoint theory.
- 2) Problems derived from intersectionality, in a very broad and inclusive sense.
- 3) Personal identities constructed through the adoption of certain perspectives.

Long abstract of *Tiempo y Perspectiva*:

The book to which this monographic section is dedicated targets a very wide audience. It is not a strictly academic book. The philosophy it contains flees from technicalities.

The central idea is that there is nothing we can appeal to beyond our perspectives. What we find by adopting perspectives cannot be contrasted, or even compared, with anything that we can access apart from those same perspectives that we adopt. This idea is one of the oldest in philosophy. And its history overlaps with the history of philosophy itself. However, it is an idea that is as easy to formulate as it is difficult to assume. We constantly want to go beyond our perspectives. We want to transcend them. And we are worried about feeling trapped. We dream of realities whose existence is independent of our beliefs and desires, our emotions, hopes and decisions. We dream of something beyond all our dreams.

But that impulse usually ends up turning against us. Let us think, for example, of the existence of a time that flows. Adopting perspectives takes time. It is a process that necessarily implies a past, a present and a future. Repeatedly, this kind of time has been considered a mere appearance, a simple subjective illusion. However, can any knowledge, scientific or philosophical, lead us to conclude that this peculiar kind of time does not really exist? Can that supposed knowledge convince us that we don't really take perspectives? The answer is surely negative. But this only opens new questions. Because, in that case, how to understand the relationships between the adoption of perspectives by a subject, an adoption that can only be subjective, and what our most solid and elaborate knowledge offers us about the nature of the objective world? Several chapters of the book try to answer this question in different ways.

That there is no court of appeal beyond the perspectives that we adopt also has direct consequences regarding the ultimate sources of justification that we can find for the contents of our experience and, consequently, for the rest of the contents that we derive from such basic contents. Let us consider the following question. Are there sharp differences between things like the intuition of mathematical and logical truths, which we obtain as a result of subjective states of supposed self-evidence, the deepest religious convictions that result from subjective states that also provide certainties that a subject cannot question, and, in third place, the altered states of consciousness that are experiential effects of the consumption of certain psychotropic substances? One of the book's chapters addresses this question arguing that the answer must be negative. There are no such sharp distinctions. However we understand the notions of "evidence", "certainty" or "experience", their force can be exactly the same in the three previous cases. Along these same lines, several more chapters of the book discuss various constructivist and relativist positions. In any case, perspectivism has always tried to distance itself from constructivism and, in general, from relativism. And how to manage to do so without dogmatically relying on realistic assumptions has been one of the greatest challenges within the tradition of perspectivism.

The very identity of perspectivism also depends on the perspectives we adopt. This is another consequence of the impossibility of an ultimate contrast with something beyond our perspectives. Precisely for this reason, it is very difficult to define perspectivism. And yet, perspectivist positions have recently emerged with great force in very diverse areas of philosophy. There is a strong perspectivist orientation within current philosophy of science.

Perspectivism is frequently used, in a local and applied way, in the philosophy of language, in the philosophy of mind, and in epistemology. And it is also common to use a perspectivist language when dealing with ethical, normative and practical issues. What do all these perspectives have in common? What do they have in common with the approaches of the main authors of the perspectivist tradition: Leibniz, Kant, Nietzsche, James, Ortega, etc.? And how do all these philosophical developments connect with the "mundane perspectivism" that has always existed in literature or in the movies and that, today, we find in TV series, comics or video games?

Although it is not possible to define perspectivism, perhaps it is possible to identify certain typical traits, or certain family resemblances, perhaps certain invariances, that allow drawing a profile with which to identify perspectivism. And this is once again a pending task.

The book is one of the results of a series of research projects carried out in recent years. Other previous publications, of an equally collective nature, closely linked to it are:

- Manuel Liz (ed.) (2013). *Puntos de vista. Una investigación filosófica*. Barcelona, Editorial Laertes.
- Margarita Vázquez y Manuel Liz (eds.) (2015). *Temporal Points of View. Objective and Subjective Aspects*. Heidelberg, Springer.
- Manuel Liz y Margarita Vázquez (eds.) (2018) *Número monográfico titulado "Puntos de vista"*. *Revista Daimon*, número 75.